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UNITED STATES V. SIOUX NATION: POLITICAL
QUESTIONS, MORAL IMPERATIVE, AND
THE NATIONAL HONORt
Stephen Cosby Hanson*
In 1877, Congress enacted a statute' that provided for the relin-
quishment by the Sioux Nation2 of some 7.5 million acres from
the Great Sioux Reservation, including one of the richest gold
fields in the world in the Black Hills3 of South Dakota and
Wyoming. The 1877 Act was passed by Congress without the
consent of the Sioux" as specifically required under article 12 of
the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868,1 which stipulated: "No treaty
for the cession of any part of the reservation ... shall be of any
validity or force as against said Indians, unless executed and
signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians. ' ' 6
Furthermore, the 1877 Act unilaterally terminated Sioux hunt-
ing rights on an additional 50 million acres7 and carved three
t Reprinted with permission of University of West Los Angeles Law Review, ©
1981. Minor differences in this article will be apparent.-Ed.
* J.D., 1981, University of West Los Angeles.
1. Act of Feb. 28, 1877, ch. 72, 19 Stat. 254-64.
2. Consisting in part of the Sioux tribes of the Rosebud Indian Reservation, South
Dakota; the Standing Rock Indian Reservation, North and South Dakota; the Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation, South Dakota; the Crow Creek Indian Reservation, South Dakota;
the Lower Brule Indian Reservation, South Dakota; the Cheyenne River Reservation,
South Dakota; the Santee Indian Reservation, Nebraska; and the Fort Peck Indian Reser-
vation, Montana.
3. For a description of the wealth of natural resources in the Black Hills, see, e.g.,
Sioux Nation v. United States, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 151, 159, 234-35, 264-66, 304-57
(1974). See also 1 BLACK HILLS MIN. ATLAS, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES
(July, 1954); J. Aase, F. Steece, "Minerals In the Economy of South Dakota," U.S.
DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES (1979) (pamphlet).
4. Sioux Nation v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1161 (Ct. Cl. 1979), affd, 448
U.S. 371 (1980); United States v. Sioux Nation, 207 Ct. Cl. 234, 238, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1016 (1975); Sioux Tribe v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 613, 650 (1942), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 789 (1943); 33 Ind. Cl. Comm'n at 362.
5. 15 Stat. 635.
6. Id. art. 12.
7. Articles I1 and 16 of the 1868 Treaty, 15 Stat. 635, had guaranteed to the Sioux
the right to hunt on certain nonreservation lands and unceded Indian territory. Under ar-
ticle 11, the Sioux agreed "that they will relinquish all right to occupy permanently the
territory outside their reservation as herein defined, but yet reserve the right to hunt on
any lands north of North Platte, and on the Republican Fork of the Smoky Hill River...."
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rights-of-way through the remaining reservation., It is notewor-
thy that these hunting rights, guaranteed by the 1868 treaty, had
been conditioned on the continuing existence of the buffalo "in
such numbers as to justify the chase." 9 Official abrogation of
these hunting rights was a mere formality, as the United States
encouraged the extermination of the buffalo,'" just as some had
advocated the extermination of the Indian."
The 1877 Act was in part the result of unsuccessful negotia-
tions with the Sioux by a commission appointed by President
Grant, at the request of Congress, to obtain the cession of the
Black Hills."2 When the commission returned to Washington, it
submitted a report in which it urged, "The least we can do is to
repay these friendly Indians honestly for the full value of the
property which was taken . . . and redress some of the wrongs
which furnish the darkest page of our history."' 3
Instead of paying just compensation for the Black Hills as the
fifth amendment requires,' 4 Congress promised to feed and
clothe the Sioux, "until the Indians are able to support
themselves."'" This, too, was no unqualified pledge; the condi-
Article 16 provides that "[TIhe United States hereby agrees and stipulates that the coun-
try north of the North Platte river and east of the summits of the Big Horn mountains
shall be held and considered to be unceded Indian territory, and also stipulates and agrees
that no white person or persons shall be permitted to settle upon or occupy any portion of
the same; or without the consent of the Indians, first had and obtained, to pass through
the same. . . ." The article 16 territory consisted of about 25 million acres, including
some of the best Sioux hunting grounds in the Powder River Valley in Wyoming and
Montana. Article 11 lands amounted to another 25 million acres, approximately, so that
in all, the Sioux possessed rights to some 50 million acres of land outside their permanent
reservation. See 97 Ct. Cl. 627-28. See also Brief for Sioux Nation at 14-17, notes 10 and
12, United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
8. Article 2 of the Act of 1877 created the right of the United States to construct
three wagon roads.
9. 15 Stat. 635, art. 11.
10. R. DRINNON, FACING WEST 330 (1980); W. Hornaday, "The Extermination of
the American Bison in Wyoming and Montana," 496-501 U.S. NAT'L MUSEUM, ANN.
REP. (1887) (pub. 1889).
11. G. HEBARD & E. BRININSTOOL, THE BOZEMAN TRAIL 129 (1922). The origin of
the phrase, "The only good Indian is a dead Indian," is traced to General Phillip H.
Sheridan in 6 E. ELLIS, THE HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY 1483 (1900). Henry Clay, while a
member of John Quincy Adams's Cabinet, stated that the Indians were not "as a race,
worth preserving." 7 C. ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 90 (1875). See also S.
Exec. Doc. No. 9, 44th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1876).
12. 4 CONG. REC., 44th Cong., 1st Sess, S 1796 (1876).
13. S. Exec. Doc. No. 9, 44th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1876).
14. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST., amend. V (1791).
15. Article 5, Act of Feb. 28, 1877, 19 Stat. 254.
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tions imposed put the Sioux at the mercy of the government. 6
For these wrongs, the Sioux have suffered greatly, as have other
Indian tribes forcibly removed 7 from lands they had occupied
for hundreds, and for some tribes, thousands of years.'" The
Sioux lawsuit over the taking of the sacred Black Hills vividly
demonstrates how long and difficult the road to justice has been
for Indians. For the Sioux, it has required four special acts of
Congress,'I more than ten million dollars in attorneys' fees, 20 and
fifty-seven years in court."'
The National Law Journal said: "Indian law attorneys agree
that the Sioux case is in a class by itself. ' 22 In terms of monetary
damages, United States v. Sioux Nation 3 is by far the largest
judgment in the 32-year history of the Indian Claims Commis-
16. Id. This "promise" was subject to three additional limiting conditions contained
in article 5 of the Act of 1877:
(i) rations would be issued only "upon full compliance with each and every obliga-
tion" imposed upon the Sioux by the 1877 Act;
(ii) "whenever schools shall have been provided by the Government for said In-
dians, no rations shall be issued for children between the ages of six and fourteen years
(the sick and infirm excepted) unless such children shall regularly attend school"; and
(iii) "[w]henever the said Indians shall be located upon lands which are suitable for
cultivation, rations shall be issued only to the persons and families of those persons who
labor (the aged, sick and infirm excepted;)."
17. Indian "removal" is a term descriptive of a period in the nation's history occur-
ring between 1789 and 1850. See text accompanying notes 63-69 infra.
18. There is some disagreement as to the length of time the Indians have inhabited
North America. The most generally accepted theory is that the American Indians traveled
from Asia across the Bering ice bridge some 8,000 to 28,000 years ago. D. HOPKINS, THE
BERING LAND BRIDGE 373 (1967). Hopi and Zuni ancestors inhabited the Southwest at
least 3,000 years ago. J. GOODMAN, AMERICAN GENESIS 196 (1980). The Sioux may have
occupied the Black Hills as soon as 150 years before 1877. H. HOOVER, THE SIOUX viii
(1979) [hereinafter cited as HOOVER].
19. (1) Act of June 3, 1920, 41 Stat. 738 (waiver of sovereign immunity and grant of
jurisdiction to Court of Claims); (2) Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 60 Stat.
1049 (new forum for all tribal grievances); (3) Act of Oct. 27, 1974, 88 Stat. 1499 (offsets
denied for "food, rations or provisions"); (4) Act of Mar. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 153 (de novo
review, without regard to defense of res judicata or collateral estoppel).
20. These fees were, of course, on a contingency basis. 25 U.S.C. § 70n (1976) pro-
vides for fees up to 10 percent of any award obtained. Attorneys for the Sioux filed for
their fees-10 percent of $105 million-in October, 1980. Rupert, Sioux Tribe's Lawyer
Just Won't Quit, AMERICAN LAWYER (Dec. 1980), at 15, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Rupert].
21. Measured from May 7, 1923, when the Sioux first filed in the Court of Claims,
pursuant to the 1920 Act (supra note 14).
22. Lewin, The Ruling That Took 23 Years, NATIONAL LAW J. (Aug. 20, 1979), at
17, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Lewin].
23. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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sion.24 On June 30, 1980, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the $105 million award, accepting the contention of the
Sioux that the 1877 Act effected a fifth amendment taking of the
Black Hills without just compensation."5 The holding may
establish precedents of greater and more positive consequence for
Indian tribes than the Sioux victory over Custer at the battle of
the Little Big Horn, in 1876, which was another reason Congress
enacted the 1877 Act.
26
There was never a question that the Sioux had been grievously
wronged. The problem of the courts has been the "lack of
satisfactory criteria for judicial determination." Such a dilemma,
as faced by the Court in Coleman v. Miller," is the hallmark of
nonjusticiability. Indian affairs have always been highly political,
and the courts are not empowered to decide political or moral
questions."2
24. The Indian Claims Commission was disbanded at the end of fiscal year 1978. 25
U.S.C. § 70v (1976). See UNITED STATES INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT
(1978). The largest previous awards include Kiowa, Comanche & Apache Tribes v. United
States, 34 Ind. C1. Comm. 263 (1974) (compromise agreement of $35,060,000 for taking
of aboriginal land); Thompson v. United States, 13 Ind. Cl. Comm. 513, 541-43 (1964)
($29,100,000 compromise agreement for taking aboriginal land in California). Yet even
the Sioux award is dwarfed by the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act [see 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1605(a), 1086, 1611, 1612 (Supp. IV, 1974)] which totals $962.5 million. The Maine In-
dian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. § 1721, signed by President Carter, Oct.
10, 1980, totaling $82.5 million. Both claims were settled out of court, and involved
aboriginal lands unrecognized by federal treaty or act.
25. 448 U.S. 371, 423-24 (1980).
26. Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer led an expeditionary force into the Black
Hills in July, 1874, in violation of the 1868 Treaty with the Sioux, for the purpose of
determining the value of the region. Subsequently, the army conducted a campaign to
remove the Sioux from treaty-established hunting grounds, which culminated with the an-
nihilation of Custer and his entire regiment on June 25, 1876. See id. at 371.
27. 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939).
28. Friedman, Interest on Indian Claims: Judicial Protection of the Fisc, 5 VAL. L.
REV. 26 n.2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Friedman]. Footnote 2 states: "In his veto
message to Congress concerning the Turtle Mountain Indians Jurisdictional Act, which
would have referred certain tribal grievances to the Court of Claims, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt declared that: '[t]his would require the Court of Claims and Supreme Court
to pass upon questions of governmental policy in dealing with the Indians, and upon the
propriety or impropriety of the Government's actions in specific cases. These are ques-
tions of a political nature which, heretofore, Congress has consistently refused to remit to
the courts for review.' " S. Doc. No. 179, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8587 (May 10, 1934). See
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903), "Plenary authority over the tribal
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department of the government."
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Indian claims were specifically excluded from Court of Claims
jurisdiction when that forum was established by Congress in
1863.29 There was no legal recourse; no courts were open to the
many tribes who had been wronged by treaty violations. Through
expensive lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill, the Indians could peti-
tion Congress, the perpetrator, for special jurisdictional acts, the
first of which was enacted in 1881.30 When such acts were passed,
the courts frequently held that the grants of jurisdiction were in-
sufficient to allow an inquiry into congressional treaty-making or
treaty abrogation." This was abundantly demonstrated in Sioux
Tribe v. United States" the progenitor of Sioux Nation, where
the Court of Claims required 76 pages to consider the scope of its
authority under the special jurisdictional act, which it found
"confers no equitable jurisdiction such as would be applicable to
the claim here presented." 33
This legal disability was remedied by Congress when it
established the Indian Claims Commission in 1946.11 Indians
29. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 765, 767. Subsequently the court's jurisdiction was
expanded to include equity and admiralty jurisdiction. However, the ban against Indian
claims was continued. Tucker Act, ch. 359, § 1, 25 Stat. 505 (1887) [now 25 U.S.C. §
1491 (1964)1.
30. Prior to the establishment of the Indian Claims Commission in 1946, 142 tribal
claims were litigated in this manner. See Hearings on H.R. 1341 and H.R. 1198 Before
the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 163-66 (1945).
31. An example is Western (Old Settlers) Cherokee Indians v. United States. 27 Ct.
CI. 1 (1891), aff'd 148 U.S. 427 (1892). The jurisdictional act granted the Court of Claims
"unrestricted latitude in adjusting and determining the said claim, so that rights, legal
and equitable, both of the United States and of said Indians [might] ...be fully con-
sidered and determined." Yet this was held insufficient to allow an inquiry into allega-
tions of fraud and duress by the United States Commissioners in procuring the treaty.
The court said that Congress had not granted authority to question the validity of the
treaty, since reformation of a treaty was a legislative function. It has been established that
more than half of the special jurisdictional acts authorizing suit by Indian tribes had to be
amended in an effort to make the alleged wrongs justiciable. Hearings on S. 2731 Before
the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1935).
32. 97 Ct. Cl. 613 (1942).
33. Id. at 685. There has been considerable disagreement among and between the In-
dian Claims Commission and Court of Claims as to whether the 1942 Court of Claims
took legal jurisdiction. As noted, it clearly did not take equitable jurisdiction. See text ac-
companying notes 134-138 infra.
34. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 [codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v-3
(1976 & Supp. 11 1978)]. Congress originally intended that the five-member commission
serve only as an advisory panel. Congress believed the older claims would require lengthy
testimony from historians, anthropologists and ethno-linguistic experts as part of a com-
plex fact-finding task, which was to have been the sole function of the commission.
However, Congress ultimately adopted a plan in which the commission evolved into a
judicial tribunal. See Vance, The Congressional Mandate and the Indian Claims Commis-
sion, 45 N.D. L. REv. 325, 326-35 (1969).
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would not only have their day in court, they would have their
own special court. While this represented a quantum step in cor-
recting the many historical wrongs inflicted upon the various
tribes, it did not eliminate evidentiary and burden of proof prob-
lems," as the Sioux would discover when the Indian Claims Com-
mission dismissed their claim in 1954;36 nor did it overcome the
extraordinary power of Congress to manage Indian affairs.
Plenary Power: An Absolute
Power Unless Subject to Judicial Review
"The history of federal dealings with the Indian people has
much too often been rule based on power, rather than on consent
of the governed."" This power was symbolically demonstrated
for the Sioux when the likeness of Washington, Jefferson, Lin-
coln, and Theodore Roosevelt were carved in colossal dimension
on Mt. Rushmore in the Black Hills.
Plenary power is defined as "authority and power as broad as
is required in a given case." 3 It is whole, complete, and exclusive
power, but it is not absolute. Yet judicial deference to Congress'
plenary power over Indians has rendered that power virtually
unlimited.3 9 Sioux counsel did not question the power of Con-
gress to take the Black Hills, only the power to do so in deroga-
tion of the fifth amendment.40 As Sioux counsel summarized,
"The concern of this case is with just compensation, not good
and evil. '" 4 '
Plenary power over Indians and Indian affairs does not merely
emanate from the Constitution;12 international law, treaty terms,
35. See Note, Systemic Discrimination in the Indian Claims Commission: The
Burden of Proof in Redressing Historical Wrongs, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1300 (1972).
36. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 2 Ind. CI. Comm. 646, 683 (1954), aff'd 146 F.
Supp. 229 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
37. I AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 107 (1977).
38. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (5th ed. 1979).
39. See, e.g., Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1226 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Chambers].
40. Brief for United States at 31, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
41. Id. at 81.
42. Indians are expressly mentioned three times in the Constitution. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3
gives Congress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes." Art. I, § 2, cl. 3 and amend. XIV, § 2 exclude
"Indians not taxed" from the count for determining congressional apportionment. Art.
II, § 2, cl. 2, the treaty-making power, implicitly extends to Indians. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1,
Congress' power to "pay the debts" and provide for the "general welfare of the United




and case law are all sources. 3 Ironically, the greatest power over
Indians derives from the doctrine of trust responsibility enun-
ciated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia." Subsequent cases demonstrated just how extensive that
power had become. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,4" referred to in
Sioux Nation as "the Indians' Dred Scott decision,"" the
Supreme Court found that on the basis of Congress' role as guar-
dian for its Indian wards, "Congress possessed a paramount
power over the property of the Indians." 47
In Sioux Nation, the government relied almost exclusively on
Lone Wolf, arguing that Congress has virtually unreviewable
power to dispose of Indian lands when acting as guardian and
trustee "for the Indians' benefit."48 While the standards of jus-
ticiability for Indian claims had left the Supreme Court powerless
to intervene on behalf of the Sioux in two earlier attempts with
the same claim,49 the Court has found its own voice and now
holds that an objective view of the 1877 Act reveals that Congress
acted not as a guardian but a conqueror.5 0
While the Court in Sioux Nation found Lone Wolf inap-
plicable, it rejected Lone Wolfs presumption of congressional
good faith." In this way, Lone Wolf still stands as the foun-
tainhead of Congress' plenary power over Indians, but it is no
longer a barrier to reasonable inquiry of long-past deeds of the
government. In rejecting the presumption of congressional good
faith, the Court in Sioux Nation held that:
[W] hether a particular congressional measure was appropriate
for protecting and advancing a tribe's interests, and therefore
not subject to the Just Compensation Clause, is factual in
nature, and the answer must be based on a consideration of all
the evidence presented. While a reviewing court is not to
43. While Congress is not bound to adhere strictly to the principles of international
law, they hold considerable moral suasion. See text accompanying notes 57-59 infra.
44. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). In this landmark case, Chief Justice Marshall enun-
ciated the guardian-ward concept of the relationship between the United States and the
various Indian tribes. See text accompanying notes 162-170 infra.
45. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
46. Sioux Nation v. United States, 601 F.2d at 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nichols, J., con-
curring), aff'd, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
47. 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
48. Brief for United States at 71, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
49. 318 U.S. 789 (1943), cert. denied; 423 U.S. 1016 (1975), cert. denied.
50. 448 U.S. at 415.
51. Id. at 414-15.
1980]
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second-guess a legislative judgement, the court is required, in
considering whether the measure was taken in pursuance to
Congress' power to manage and control tribal lands for the In-
dians' welfare, to engage in thorough and impartial examina-
tion of the historical record. A presumption of congressional
good faith cannot serve to advance such an inquiry. 2
The Age of Colonialization and Conquest
Because it is the dictate of the Supreme Court that "a
thorough and impartial examination of the historical record" be
made," and because the 1877 Act cannot be fully appreciated
without an understanding of the historical basis of federal Indian
policy, the following summary of events is offered.
Shortly after Columbus "discovered" the New World, Spain
and Portugal signed the Treaty of Tordesillas, with the Pope's
blessing, establishing a Spanish and Portuguese division of the
world.54 Indians were considered heathens, to be subjugated to
the will of their "discoverors."" Title to lands in the New World
would accrue upon discovery or conquest. 6
As international law principles developed, the rights of Indians
were recognized. Franciscus de Victoria,7 whose lectures form
the basis of international law, argued in the 1520s that Indians
were human beings, and that their possession of land should be
respected, even where no formal deeds or treaties existed. He
maintained that the Treaty of Tordesillas could serve only as
establishing zones for trading and proselytizing, not as a distribu-
tion of land." Our respect for Indian title and occupancy can be
traced to these Spanish origins."
In 1625 the first deed of Indian land granted to English col-
onists was signed by Chief Samoset, a Pemaquid, giving 12,000
acres to the first settlers at Plymouth Rock.60 One hundred fifty-
52. Id. (syllabus), at 373.
53. Id.
54. See W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW 5 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as WASHBURN].
55. Id. at 6.
56. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-76 (1823).
57. The Seventh Pan-American Conference, on Dec. 23, 1943, acclaimed Victoria as
the man "who established the foundations of modern international law."
58. F. Victoria, De Indis et de lyre Belli Reflectiones 110, 11 (1557), CLASSICS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 262-63 (J. Bate tr. 1917).
59. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 45 (1947).





two years later, in one of the first great acts of our Congress, the
Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787, declared:
Art. 3 ...The utmost good faith shall always be observed
towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be
taken from them without their consent; and in their property,
rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed,
unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws
founded in justice and humanity shall, from time to time, be
made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for
preserving peace and friendship with them.6
This high standard was incompatible with the insatiable ter-
ritorial demands of the huge tide of European immigrants, as
they settled outward from the original colonies.62 Thus, voluntary
cessions by the Indians became virtually impossible. The response
of the government was to effect a policy of Indian removal, and
between 1789 and 1850, 245 treaties were imposed on the Indians,
transferring ownership in 450 million acres of land at twenty
cents an acre.63
By the 1830s Indian relations were in a state of chaos. Lewis
Cass, the then secretary of the war department, which was in
charge of Indian affairs, stated in his annual report that "[a]
crisis in Indian affairs has evidently arrived which calls for the
establishment of a system of policy adapted to the existing state
of things, and calculated to fix upon a permanent basis the future
destiny of the Indians. ' '1 4 In direct response to Secretary Cass's
report, Congress passed the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of
1834,65 which had the effect of recodifying past legislation regard-
ing Indian removal. The most significant part of the Act was its
definition of Indian country:
[TIhat all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi,
and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the ter-
ritory of Arkansas, and also, that part of the United States east
of the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the
Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this
61. Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51n (1789).
62. W. BLUMENTHAL, AMERICAN INDIANS DISPOSSESSED 18 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as BLUMENTHAL].
63. Id.
64. F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 256 (1962).
65. Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
19801
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act, [shall] be taken and deemed to be the Indian country. 6
Before the ink was dry, Congress moved this "permanent Indian
frontier" from the Mississippi to the 95th Meridian, another
200-300 miles farther west. 7
The treatment of Indians in this period of President Andrew
Jackson's accelerated Indian removal is one of the most shameful
chapters in our history and is a stain upon the national honor
that can never be completely erased. In the South, Choctaws,
Cherokees, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Seminoles were forced to
give up their homelands. Bitter and expensive War Department
operations were implemented to effect the removal policy."
Cherokees were put in prison camps, then marched along the in-
famous "Trail of Tears," where one in four died of cold and
starvation. 9 By 1860, the United States had grown to a nation of
some thirty million mostly European descendants.7 The Indian
population at that time was perhaps in excess of one-quarter
million, less than half what it had been when Samoset had shared
corn with the starving Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock.7
Brief Sioux History
From time immemorial, the Sioux inhabited the lush forests at
the headwaters of the Mississippi River." French fur traders and
Roman Catholic priests dealt successfully with the Sioux from the
1630s until the mid-1700s, when the Sioux were invaded by the
Ojibwa Tribe, which was armed with European firearms." The
Sioux retreated to the prairies and distant foothills of the Rocky
Mountains. As the Sioux became accustomed to a new life-style
in these regions, representatives from France, Spain, and later the
United States proclaimed title to the same region, known then as
Upper Louisiana. 4
Thomas Jefferson, who continued the tradition of the "Great
White Father" begun by George Washington, by referring to the
66. Id., § 1.
67. BROWN, supra note 60, at 6.
68. G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL 383-85 (1932).
69. BROWN, supra note 60, at 6.
70. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS, 8, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
sus (1975).
71. BROWN, supra note 60, at 9.
72. HOOVER, supra note 18, at vii.
73. Id. at viii.




Indians as "my children" and "my son,""5 had been privately
advocating an expedition across the Louisiana Territory since the
Washington administration.7 6 When the Louisiana Purchase was
consummated with unexpected swiftness in 1803, Jefferson had
already organized the Lewis and Clark expedition, which would
peacefully encounter many Indian tribes, including the Sioux."' It
is worth noting that the terms of the Louisiana Purchase required
that the inhabitants of the territory be entitled "to the enjoyment
of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the
United States" according to the principles of the Federal Con-
stitution. 8 Presumably, this was not meant to include Indians.79
In 1805 the United States entered its first treaty with the Sioux,
in which Lieutenant Zebulon Pike0 obtained a grant from the
Sioux
for the purpose of the establishment of military posts, nine
miles square at the mouth of the river St. Croix, also from
below the confluence of the Mississippi and St. Peters, up the
Mississippi, to include the falls of St. Anthony, extending nine
miles on each side of the river. That the Sioux Nation grants to
the United States, the full sovereignty and power over said
districts forever, without any let or hindrance whatsoever.8
In consideration of the above grants, the United States agreed to
pay the Sioux $2,000, or the equivalent in merchandise."
The Sioux made additional land cessions to the United States
in treaties concluded in 1836, 1837, and 1851,83 among others,
each time being confined to a smaller area. The Supreme Court,
in its Sioux Nation opinion, gives an excellent survey of the rela-
tions between the Sioux and the United States, beginning with the
Fort Laramie Treaty of April 29, 1868.84 It is a version of history
that the Sioux can basically accept.
75. 16 A. LIPSCOMB & A. BERGH, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 425-27
(1904).
76. C. BOWERS, THE YOUNG JEFFERSON, 1743-1789, 427 (1945).
77. 7 R. THWAITES, ORIGINAL JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK EXPEDITION, 1804-06,
522 (1904).
78. S. WEBSTER, TWO TREATIES OF PARIS AND THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1901).
79. Id. at 4.
80. Namesake for Pike's Peak, 14,110 feet, the 32nd highest and most famous
mountain in Colorado. U.S Geological Survey.
81. G. FAY, TREATIES, AND LAND CESSIONS, BETWEEN THE BANDS OF THE SIOUX AND
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1805-1906, 1, art. 1 (1972).
82. Id., art. 2.
83. Id. at 43-75.
84. 15 Ptat. 635.
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The abrogation of the 1868 Treaty is the basis of this lawsuit."
While an unbroken Indian treaty is a rarity, "a more ripe and
rank case of dishonorable dealings will never, in all probability,
be found in our history," 6 than the breaking of the Fort Laramie
Treaty.
The army, at the direction of Congress and President Grant,
unceremoniously violated the 1868 Treaty when it conducted a
reconnaissance expedition into the Black Hills.87 In 1874 Brevet
Major General George Armstrong Custer led the mission and had
prearranged to announce the discovery of gold.8 This news
brought a flood of miners to the Black Hills, which the Grant ad-
ministration then used as justification for mew negotiations with
the Sioux.89 When commissioners appointed to the task failed to
reach an agreement, they recommended that Congress fix a sum
"as a fair equivalent of the value of the hills" and present it to
the Indians as a finality." As the Supreme Court held, a fair
equivalent was never paid."
The Court reached this conclusion by application of the Fort
Berthold "good faith effort" test.2 An objective inquiry into
Congress' enactment of the 1877 Act led the Court of Claims to
find that, "the terms upon which Congress acquired the Black
Hills were not the product of any meaningful negotiation or
arm's-length bargaining, and did not reflect or show any con-
sidered judgment by Congress that it was paying a fair price. '"93
Furthermore, "[tihe only item of 'consideration' that possibly
could be viewed as showing an attempt by Congress to give the
Sioux the 'full value' of the land the government took from them
was the requirement to furnish them with rations until they
became self-sufficient." 94 And finally, "[there is no indication
that Congress believed that, or even considered whether, the
obligation it assumed to furnish the Sioux with rations until they
85. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
86. 207 Ct. Cl. at 241.
87. W. WASHBURN, ASSAULT ON INDIAN TRIBALISM, THE GENERAL ALLOTMENT ACT
OF 1887, 4 (1975).
88. D. JACKSON, CUSTER'S GOLD 86 (1966).
89. Letter from President Ulysses S. Grant to the Senate and House of Represen-
tatives, Dec. 22, 1876, S. Exec. Doc. No. 9, 44th Cong., 2d Sess. 1.
90. 1 W. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES 199-203 (1973).
91. 448 U.S. at 424.
92. Id. at 407-409.
93. 601 F.2d at 1167.




could support themselves, constituted the fair equivalent of the
value of the lands the United States was acquiring from them." ' 95
Litigation Chronology
From 1877 to 1920, the Sioux Indians were barred from suing
the government.9" In 1909 the Sioux petitioned Congressman
Eben Wever Martin, seeking payment for their pony herds which
had been confiscated after Custer's defeat at the battle of Little
Big Horn. Congressman Martin refused to get on the petition.97
In 1923, pursuant to a special jurisdictional act,9s the Sioux
filed a petition in the Court of Claims. The case was not heard
until 1942, when it was dismissed. 99 The extreme delay between
the filing of the suit and the 1942 adjudication can only be at-
tributed to the combination of the Great Depression and the
political turbulence preceding World War II, and the fact that the
Sioux were less eager to seek money damages than the return of
the land,'00 the latter being beyond the power of the court."0 1 In
1946, Congress established the Indian Claims Commission. 10 2
Four years later, in 1950, the Sioux resubmitted their claim to the
Indian Claims Commission. In 1954 the claim was dismissed for
failure to meet the burden of proof.' 3 After the dismissal was af-
firmed on appeal to the Court of Claims, the Sioux retained new
counsel, who were able to have the affirmance vacated.0 4
In November of 1958, the Indian Claims Commission reopened
the case."05 A decision was reached in 1974 holding that the 1877
Act constituted a fifth amendment taking. 0 6 However, the Court
of Claims reversed, holding in 1975 that res judicata barred
95. Id. at 1168.
96. See text accompanying note 28, supra.
97. Deloria, "Like the Victory Over Custer, the Sioux's Legal Win Can Mean
Defeat," L.A. Times, July 6, 1980, pt. iv (opinion), at I [hereinafter cited as Deloria].
98, Act of June 3, 1920, ch. 222, 41 Stat. 738 (waiver of sovereign immunity and
grant of jurisdiction to Court of Claims).
99. 97 Ct. Cl. at 689.
100. Telephone conversation Feb. 18, 1981, with Robert T. Coulter, counsel for
Amicus Curiae Indian Law Resource Center, United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371
(1980).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
102. 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v (1964).
103. 2 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 670, 683 (1954).
104. See Sioux Tribe v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 912 (1968) (Summary of pro-
ceedings. This unusual result-vacation of judgment-was achieved by allegations of in-
competence of former Sioux counsel.) See 448 U.S. at 385 and 33 Ind. C1. Comm. at 152.
105. 182 Ct. Cl. at 913.
106. 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 362.
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recovery ' under the fifth amendment but allowing a claim under
section 70a(5) of the Indian Claims Commission Act without in-
terest.I08 Sioux lawyers successfully lobbied Congress for a waiver
of res judicata and instruction for de novo review by the Court of
Claims in 1979.109
The Legal Battleground
The Indian Law Reporter succinctly stated the issue of Sioux
Nation: "Does legislation that divests an Indian tribe of a portion
of its lands in consideration of undertaking to provide material
assistance and food rations as long as needed amount to 'taking'
under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause so as to
entitle the tribe to interest on later award for the value of the
lands?""'  The answer to the question posed is no, if the court
does not, cannot, or will not take jurisdiction. Two threshold
issues of justiciability must be determined before the fifth amend-
ment question can be answered. First, is res judicata a bar? Se-
cond, is this a political question? To the first preliminary ques-
tion, the Court of Claims held yes, in 1975.t" "The Commission's
taking theory founders on the bar of res judicata."1 2
To the second inquiry, "is this a political question", the Court
of Claims answered affirmatively in 1942,113 citing Beecher v.
Wetherby."4 The court found the jurisdictional act sufficient for
107. 207 Ct. Cl. at 241.
108. Section 70a of the Indian Claims Commission Act establishes five categories of
wrongs made compensable under its terms, none of which authorizes payment of interest:
"(1) claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution, laws, treaties of the United
States, and Executive orders of the President; (2) all other claims in law or equity, in-
cluding those sounding in tort, with respect to which the claimant would have been enti-
tled to sue in a court of the United States if the United States was subject to suit; (3) claims
which would result if the treaties, contracts, and agreements between the claimant and the
United States were revised on the ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration,
mutual or unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact, or any other ground cognizable by a
court of equity; (4) claims arising from the taking by the United States, whether as the
result of a treaty or cession or otherwise, of lands owned or occupied by the claimant
without the payment for such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and (5)
claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule
of law or equity." Ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1050 (1946), 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976).
109. Act of Mar. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 153.
110. 7 INDIAN L. RPTR. 1010, May, 1980, paraphrasing the language contained in the
Brief for the United States at 2, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
111. 207 Ct. Cl. at 241.
112. Id.
113. 97 Ct. Cl. at 672.




the adjudication of legal claims" 5 but insufficient to "go behind
the Acts of Congress and inquire into any moral obligation of the
Government. . . .We cannot consider and adjudicate it unless
and until Congress has unmistakably indicated its intention that
we should do so." " 6 If only Congress is to determine when there
shall be judicial review, then, q.e.d., it is a political question."'
When the Supreme Court adjudicated these same two issues in
1980, it held opposite to the 1942 and 1975 Court of Claims deci-
sions. Yet the Supreme Court did not reverse the Court of Claims
on either occasion; it denied certiorari on motion by Sioux
counsel."8
As between the issues of res judicata and the political question
doctrine, the latter is by far the more intriguing. Res judicata was
not an issue in Sioux Nation until 1975,119 whereas politics have
been determinative from the beginning.
Res Judicata and Separation of Powers
In Sioux Nation, defendant United States challenged only the
award of interest as part of the final judgment of the 1979 Court
of Claims.'20 The government did not argue the defense of res
judicata. It was Justice Rehnquist who sought, sua sponte, to
dismiss the Sioux claim.1 2' In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Rehnquist states that the policies underlying res judicata are "not
115. 97 Ct. Cl. at 686.
116. Id. at 685.
117. Six criteria relating to the determination of a political question are enunciated in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962): "Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question." Each of these criteria has had
some degree of applicability to Indian claims; see text accompanying the following notes
for examples of each: (1) note 42 supra; (2) note 27 supra; (3,4) notes 147-149 infra; (5)
note 116 supra; and (6) note 167 infra.
118. 318 U.S. 789 (1943), cert. denied; 423 U.S. 1016 (1975), cert. denied.
119. Res judicata was discussed in the 1954 Indian Claims Commission opinion, but
the Commission said, "In view of the decision rendered on the merits, the question of
whether or not the decisions are res judicata becomes immaterial." 2 Ind. CI. Comm. at
673.
120. Brief for United States at 48, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
121. Id. at 432.
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based solely on the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens
of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of
unnecessary judicial waste."' 22
When the Indian Claims Commission was established in 1946,
Congress waived the defenses of sovereign immunity and statute
of limitations.' 23 There was no general waiver of res judicata in-
cluded in the Act; therefore, a previous decision on the merits
would constitute a bar to further litigation of the same claim.
Thus, when the 1975 Court of Claims held that the Sioux claim
was barred by the res judicata effect of the 1942 Court of Claims
decision,' 4 Sioux counsel petitioned Congress for an amendment
to the Indian Claims Commission Act.'25 Their success is
reflected in Public Law 95-243, which states in material part:
[Tihe Court of Claims shall review on the merits, without
regard to the defense of res judicata or collateral estoppel, that
portion of the determination of the Indian Claims Commission
entered February 15, 1974, adjudging that the Act of February
28, 1877 (19 Stat. 254), effected a taking of the Black Hills por-
tion of the Great Sioux Reservation in violation of the fifth
amendment, and shall enter judgment accordingly. In conduct-
ing such review, the Court shall receive and consider any addi-
tional evidence, including oral testimony, that either party may
wish to provide on the issue of a fifth amendment taking and
shall determine that issue de novo. 26
Justice Rehnquist is probably correct when he says, "I am con-
vinced that Congress may not constitutionally require the Court
of Claims to reopen this proceeding .... "I However, his opin-
ion in this instance is not entirely inconsistent with the majority
holding, for while Congress certainly could not compel the Court
to readjudicate the Sioux claim, nor any other previously litigated
case,'28 there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court has the
power to accept a waiver of res judicata by Congress, and
relitigate a claim if it chooses.'29 Rehnquist, the lone dissenter,
122. Id.
123. 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976).
124. 207 Ct. C1. at 241.
125. Lewin, supra note 22, at 17, col. 3.
126. Pub. L. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153, amending § 20(B) of the Indian Claims Commis-
sion Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 70s(b) (Supp. 11 1976).
127. 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980).
128. Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1944).




would not be compelled to reexamine a "question previously
decided by an Art. III Court."' 30
The majority in Sioux Nation carefully considered the directive
of Public Law 95-243 to determine if it constituted a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine. This inquiry is pursued by the
Court on two levels.' 31 The first is whether "Congress impermis-
sibly has disturbed the finality of a judicial decree by rendering
the Court of Claims' earlier judgments in this case mere advisory
opinions."' 32 The second is whether Congress "overstepped its
bounds by granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction to decide the
merits of the Black Hills claim, while prescribing a rule for deci-
sion that left the Court no adjudicatory function to perform."' 33
The Court concluded that "neither of the two separation of
powers objections described above is presented by this legisla-
tion."' 34
While the government chose not to argue the defense of res
judicata before the Supreme Court, it did raise the claim in the
1975 Court of Claims.'35 However, when Justice Rehnquist says
that the Court of Claims "found no basis for relieving the Sioux
from the bar of res judicata.. .,,,16 he fails to mention that
there was no discussion of whether the Court had the power to
accept a congressional waiver of res judicata, but merely whether
the 1942 Court of Claims had taken jurisdiction and reached its
decisions on the merits of the Black Hills taking claim.'37 For if it
did not, res judicata would not apply.' 38
The 1975 Court of Claims was obviously annoyed as to this
question when it responded to the 1974 Indian Claims Commis-
sion. It held that, "The Commission really imputes a gross im-
propriety to this court,"'' 39 because the 1974 Commission con-
130. 448 U.S. at 434.
131. Id. at 391.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 392.
134. Id. at 395.
135. Answering Brief for United States at 9, 200 Ct. Cl.
136. 448 U.S. at 426.
137. 207 Ct. Cl. at 249.
138. "It is settled that the judgement of a court dismissing a suit for lack of jurisdic-
tion is not a judgement on the merits and therefore does not bar a future suit on the same
cause of action. Smith v. McNeal, 109 U.S. 426, 429 (1883); Hughs v. United States,
supra; Walden v. Bodley, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 156, 161 (1840); see General Investment Co.
v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry, 260 U.S. 261, 288 (1922). If, as plaintiffs argue,
the Court of Claims dismissed their claim in 1942 for lack of jurisdiction plaintiffs are not
barred from reasserting that claim." 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 196-97.
139. 207 Ct. Cl. at 242.
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cluded that the 1942 Court of Claims held that it lacked jurisdic-
tion over the Sioux claim. 140
Judge Davis's dissenting opinion in the 1975 Court of Claims
offers the best argument in favor of the position maintained by
the 1974 Indian Claims Commission, gross improprieties not-
withstanding, that jurisdiction was not taken in 1942:
In the end, the best I can make of the 1942 opinion is that the
terms of the jurisdictional act were so entangled in the court's
mind with its ultimate determination adverse to the Indians on
the Fifth Amendment claim that the Government should fail in
its current defense of res judicata. The "jurisdictional" com-
ponent seems to me to have been too large a factor in the 1942
holding to preclude the Nation from its right to show now that
the acquisition of the Black Hills was a Fifth Amendment tak-
ing, without just and adequate compensation, rather than
merely a violation of fair and honorable dealings. I am not per-
suaded that in 1942 the Indians had the opportunity to present
their Fifth Amendment claim to a tribunal which deemed itself
fully empowered to decide all aspects of that demand on their
merits.' 41
A summary review of the Court's holding relative to res
judicata reveals that:
(1) "The power of Congress to waive such an adjudication,
of course, is clear."'' 14
(2) "Congress may recognize its obligation to pay a moral
debt."' 43
(3) Where Congress is "to all intents and purposes the defen-
dant," it is not an invasion of the judicial power to "come into
court... and say that they will not plead the former trial in bar,
140. 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 207.
141. 207 Ct. Cl. at 253-54.
142. Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U.S. 476, 486 (1926). "The power of
Congress by special act to waive any defense, either legal or equitable, which the Govern-
ment may have to a suit in this court, as it did in the Nock and Cherokee Nation cases,
has never been questioned. The reports of the court are replete with cases where Con-
gress, impressed with the equitable justice of claims which have been rejected by the court
on legal grounds, has, by special act, waived defenses of the Government which prevented
recover. and conferred jurisdiction on the court to again adjudicate the case. In such in-
stances the court proceeded in conformity with the provisionfiof the act of reference and
in cases, too numerous for citation here, awarded judgments to claimants whose claims
had previously been rejected." Richardson v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 948, 957 (1935).




nor interpose the legal objection which defeated a recovery
before ... "I"
Given this holding by the Supreme Court, there is no reason
why any Indian claim previously adjudicated by the Indian
Claims Commission, the Court of Claims, or the Supreme Court
itself could not be relitigated, if Congress waives res judicata. As
might be expected, there is a catch-22: the precedential value of
holdings pursuant to special jurisdictional acts, such as Sioux Na-
tion, and all other Indian Claims Commission holdings, "may be
limited to the jurisdiction conferred by those acts." '45 And, of
course, whether Congress chooses to waive res judicata is a
political question.
The Political Question Doctrine
When the Court of Claims dismissed the Sioux's Black Hills
suit in 1942, it cited Beecher v. Wetherby. '6 "Plenary authority
over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Con-
gress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed
a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial depart-
ment of the Government."' 7 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,'"8 upon
which the government relied heavily in the Black Hills case, also
cites Beecher v. Wetherby at length, echoing the notion that In-
dian affairs are not subject to judicial review." 9 Before 1946,
suits by Indian tribes, other than those under special jurisdic-
tional acts, were generally limited to equitable jurisdiction, as
"injunctive remedy was the only one available" to the tribes.'
After 1946, when Congress established the Indian Claims Com-
mission, the courts had less reason to hold that Indian affairs
were beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. However, there re-
mained two monumental barriers to the cause of the Indians. The
first is -the principle that Congress may unilaterally abrogate In-
dian treaties.' This is analogous to the rule that Congress may
enact legislation inconsistent with treaties between the United
144. Nock v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 451, 457-58 (1867).
145. Chambers, supra note 39, at 1247.
146. 95 U.S. 517 (1877).
147. 97 Ct. Cl. at 672.
148. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
149. Id. at 568.
150. Nichols, J., concurring, 601 F.2d at 1174.
151. 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). "A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and
an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty." Cherokee Tobacco Cases. 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 616, 621 (1871).
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States and foreign nations and, likewise, Congress may enter
treaties with foreign nations inconsistent with existing
legislation."5 2 While the appearance of uniformity is preserved,
unilateral abrogation of Indian treaties fails to honor the unique
trust relationship between the United States and the various In-
dian tribes." 3
A second barrier, and even more devastating to the tribes'
quest for justice, has been the presumption that whenever Con-
gress enacts legislation pursuant to its trust responsibility, it is
acting "in perfect good faith" for the benefit of the tribes." 4 For
example, in Sioux Nation, the government argued that, "A
disposal of tribal property in the discharge of this responsibility
to manage the property for the tribe's benefit is an act on behalf
of the tribe and, in effect, a disposal by the tribe."'55 It was fur-
ther argued that, "In our view, the true rule is that Congress
must be assumed to be acting within its plenary power to manage
tribal assets if it reasonably can be concluded that the legislation
was intended to promote the welfare of the tribe."' 15 6
It is difficult to imagine how the confiscation of the Black
Hills, with its billions of dollars in gold, silver, uranium, and
other natural resources'57 could be called management "to pro-
mote the welfare of the tribe." As Cardozo said in another In-
dian "taking" case, "Spoilation is not management."'15
Nevertheless, convoluted logic of this type has prevailed over
our Indian brothers for three centuries. Subjugation of the tribes
has resulted not only from the sword and gun, but from the rule
of law, which in their case is accurately described as "the whim
of the sovereign."159
The Supreme Court has always proceeded with extreme caution
in the face of opposition from the political branches of govern-
ment, i.e., the legislative and executive departments. 6 1 In what
152. "The last expression of the sovereign will must control." Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 141 (1965).
153. See text accompanying notes 164-170 infra.
154. 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
155. Brief for United States at 48, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
156. Id. at 52.
157. See note 2 supra.
158. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 498 (1937), cited in 448 U.S. at
408.
159. Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Abroiginal Title Reconsidered. 31
HASTINGS L.J. 1215 (July, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Newton].




has been described as "the most serious crisis in the history of the
Court,"'' Chief Justice John Marshall formulated the concept
of the trust relationship between the United States and the In-
dians.
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated
domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which
we assert a title independent of their will, which must take ef-
fect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their rela-
tion to the United States resembles that of a ward to its guar-
dian.' 6 2
Marshall's decision in Cherokee Nation has been compared to
his decision in Marbury v. Madison,'63 where the Chief Justice
established the fundamental constitutional law principle of
judicial review. 64 In each case, the Court held that it lacked
jurisdiction, partly because the authority of the Supreme Court
was open to some question. In the follow-on case to Cherokee
Nation, Worcester v. Georgia,'5 Chief Justice Marshall was
more assertive. There, the Court overturned two Georgia indict-
ments on the ground that the state of Georgia had no jurisdiction
on Cherokee land.'66 For his courage, Marshall was rebuffed; the
Court's order was never enforced. President Jackson defiantly
proclaimed, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him
enforce it." 16 7
Nevertheless, the Cherokee Nation decision remains at the
heart of the federal-Indian relationship. The guardian-ward con-
cept has been expanded by the courts and is described as "moral
obligations of the highest responsibility and trust."' 68 Yet the
concept of the trust relationship enunciated by Marshall in
Cherokee Nation has been used by Congress as a springboard to
expanded powers over Indians. The Court has consistently held
that the tribes were incapable of prudent management of their
161. 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 189 (1923).
162. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
163. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
164. Id. at 176.
165. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
166. Id. at 596-97.
167. 1 H. GREELEY, AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1864).
168. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942), relied upon in Nava-
jo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322 (1966); Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (1973).
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communal property,' 69 and on that assumption expressed little
difficulty in deferring to the presumptively better judgment of the
trustee, Congress. The Court made this clear in the relatively re-
cent decision of Board of County Commissioners v. Seber"'7 :
In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United States
overcame the Indians and took possession of their lands,
sometimes by force, leaving them an uneducated, helpless and
dependent people, needing protection against the selfishness of
others and their own improvidence. Of necessity, the United
States assumed the duty of furnishing that protection, and with
it the authority to do all that was required to perform that
obligation and to prepare the Indians to take their place as in-
dependent, qualified, members of the modern body politic.' 7 '
While Sioux counsel acknowledged "the underlying constitu-
tional authority of Congress to manage and dispose of Indian
property for their best interests,"' 2 they urged the Court to re-
ject the "presumption that any legislation by Congress was in-
tended to promote the welfare of the Sioux .... ,,I'3
The Supreme Court, in a significant departure from the com-
mand of Lone Wolf, held that the Lone Wolf Court's
conclusive presumption of congressional good faith was based
in large measure on the idea that relations between this Nation
and the Indian tribes are a political matter, not amenable to
judicial review. That view, of course, has long since been
discredited in takings cases, and was expressly laid to rest in
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks.' 74
The Standard of Review and Fiscal Considerations
It is an inescapable conclusion that the courts have struggled to
formulate a special standard of review for Indian claims under
the fifth amendment just compensation clause which would not
"distribute any undue share of the nation's wealth to the
Indians."'5
In Sioux Nation, in denouncing the very standard the Supreme
Court would later praise, Court of Claims Judges Bennett and
169. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 305 (1902).
170. 318 U.S. 705 (1943).
171. Id. at 715.
172. Brief for Sioux at 86, 448 U.S. at 413.
173. Brief at 37-8.
174. Id., citing 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977).




Kunzig stated, "courts must be careful in construing ambiguous
precedents where the results of liberal construction are enormous
judgments against the United States."' 76 The Supreme Court
itself has admittedly been influenced by fiscal considerations. In
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,77 Justice Reed, writing for
the majority, cited a Justice Department report that estimated
liability of the United States for Indian land claims at $9
billion.'78 Justice Reed's reliance on that figure was misplaced;
the record now shows, twenty-five years after Tee-Hit-Ton, that
the total damages awarded by the Indian Claims Commission is
less than 10 percent of the Justice Department estimate.179 Other,
more thorough, research shows an even greater difference.'
The biggest reason for the disparity is the matter of interest.
Under the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment, in-
terest is a recognized component,' 8' even for Indian claims.'82
When 5 percent interest is added to a 100-year-old claim, for ex-
ample, the result is an award multiplied fivefold. However, not
all Indian land claims are cognizable under the fifth
amendment;' 3 furthermore, the Indian Claims Commission Act,
by its terms, establishes legal and equitable grounds of recovery,
but is silent on the question of interest.8 4
176. 601 F.2d at 1182.
177. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
178. Id. at 283 n.17.
179. See UNITED STATES INDIAN CLAIMS COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 125 (1978). (Total
awards: $818,172,606.64. The $9 billion estimate presumed a dismissal rate of zero, when
in fact it approached 50 percent.) .
180. See Newton, supra note 159, at 1249 n.201.
181. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1933).
182. Justice Cardozo put the matter in clear perspective, writing in Shoshone Tribe v.
United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1936): "Power to control and manage the property and
affairs of Indians in good faith for their betterment and welfare may be exerted in many
ways and at times even in derogation of the provisions of a treaty. Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553, 564, 565, 566. The power does not extend so far as to enable the
Government to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes,
without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation ... ; for that
'would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation.' United States v.
Creek Nation, supra, p. 110; citing Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113;
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307-308."
183. Justice Reed's fears in Tee-Hit-Ton are the basis for the distinction between
"aboriginal title" or "original Indian title" and "recognized title." The latter exists
where Congress, by treaty or act, has recognized specific Indian tribes as "owners" of
defined areas. A taking by Congress of "recognized title" lands requires just compensa-
tion under the fifth amendment. A taking by the United States of "aboriginal title" was
held not compensable under the fifth amendment in Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. 272, 277, 279,
284-85, 290-91 (1955). See also note 108, supra.
184. See note 108, supra.
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The courts have utilized a variety of methods to avoid an
award of interest." 5 In the Sioux case, the 1975 Court of Claims
considered the distinction between an award pursuant to section
70a(5)1" of the Indian Claims Commission Act, and an award
based on Congress' exercise of its power of eminent domain,
which would invoke the fifth amendment. The opinion quotes the
following oral argument:
.Judge Davis: ... The difference really is, whether the Tribes
will be entitled to interest on whatever the valuation is? The
Commission came up with...
Gov't Atty.: 17 million dollars...
Judge Davis: But now the whole difference is interest,
whether they get paid the interest?
Gov't Atty.: That's all we're arguing about.' 7
The court's holding was consistent with the government's desire
to restrict the award to principal only; it allowed the Sioux's
claim under section 70a(5) but denied the fifth amendment claim,
which would have included interest, on the bar of res judicata.'
The Fort Berthold "Good Faith Effort" Test
In 1968 the Court of Claims attempted to reconcile Congress'
"paramount power over the property of Indians" as exemplified
by Lone Wolf,"I9 and the more recent series of decisions that held
that this plenary power "was not absolute."' 90 The result of that
effort in Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United
States '9 was the "good faith effort" test, 192 which developed a
formula to determine whether Congress, in enacting legislation
affecting Indians, is acting as trustee for the benefit of the In-
dians, or is exercising its sovereign power of eminent domain.' 93
The 1979 Court of Claims summarized the test as follows:
In determining whether Congress has made a good faith effort
185. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Claims Before the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. L.J. 511,
526-28 (1966).
186. See note 108, supra.
187. 207 Ct. Cl. at 237.
188. Id. at 240-41.
189. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
190. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935).
191. 182 Ct. Cl. 543 (1968).





to give the Indians the full value of their lands when the
government acquired it, we therefore look to the objective facts
as revealed by Acts of Congress, congressional committee
reports, statements submitted to Congress by government of-
ficials, reports of special commissions appointed by Congress
to treat with the Indians, and similar evidence relating to the
acquisition. As hereinafter shown, this is the kind of evidence
upon which we have relied in reaching our conclusion in this
case.
The "good faith effort" and "transmutation of property"
concepts referred to in Fort Berthold are opposite sides of the
same coin. They reflect the traditional rule that a trustee may
change the form of trust assets, as long as he fairly (or in good
faith) attempts to provide his ward with property of equivalent
value. If he does that, he cannot be faulted if hindsight should
demonstrate a lack of precise equivalence. On the other hand,
if a trustee (or the government in its dealings with the Indians)
does not attempt to give the ward the fair equivalent of what
he acquires from him, the trustee to that extent has taken
rather than transmuted the property of the ward. In other
words, an essential element of the inquiry under the Fort
Berthold guideline is determining the adequacy of the con-
sideration the government gave for the Indian lands it ac-
quired.'94
While the Supreme Court found this test "a standard that
ought to be emulated," '95 the Fort Berthold test has been severely
criticized. 96 The dissenting opinion in the 1979 Court of Claims
states that the Fort Berthold standard "makes a mockery out of
the fifth amendment. . ".. ,9 This paper will not pursue that con-
tention, for while the "good faith effort" test is arguably more
stringent than the normal standard' 8 for fifth amendment viola-
tions, its application in Sioux Nation resulted in a finding of a
fifth amendment taking. 99
194. 601 F.2d at 1162.
195. 448 U.S. at 424.
196. See Friedman, supra note 28. Sioux counsel described the test as "ill-conceived,
unnecessary and erroneous." Brief for Sioux at 56, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
197. 601 F.2d at 1181.
198. Ever since Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893),
determination of just compensation has been a judicial function. Under the Fort Berthold
test, the courts may make such a determination only upon a showing of fraud or bad
faith.
199. See notes 90-95 and accompanying text, supra.
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Conclusion
The Black Hills case is far from over. The Oglala Sioux Tribe
has entered a stipulation with the government halting payment
of their share of the $105 million award,2 °0 and other tribes of
the Sioux Nation may also refuse to accept the award. Accep-
tance of money damages would probably extinguish any Sioux
land claims in the Black Hills.201 Yet assuming that the tribes
decide to take the money, disbursement will take several years;
tribal membership rolls must be verified,20 2 and a plan for use
of the money must be approved in turn by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, the Department of Interior, and finally, Congress.20 3
In the hope that at least some of the land taken by the 1877
Act would be returned to the Sioux, the Oglala Tribe filed a suit
on July 18, 1980, in federal district court seeking to quiet title to
"certain land, commonly referred to as the Black Hills." 20 4 The
suit was dismissed on September 11, 1980, and the Oglala ap-
pealed. 20 s On January 18, 1982, the Supreme Court denied certi-
orari.
Congress-and the courts-have struggled with the "Indian
problem" since colonial days. When the problem was viewed as a
military one, the army was called out; when the dilemma was seen
as one of civilizing the Indians, missionaries and teachers were
called upon. Today, it is a problem delegated to bureaucrats and
lawyers. The "Indian problem" will persist despite all these ef-
forts as long as we ignore, deny, or whitewash the past.
200. Rupert, supra note 20.
201. Ivins, "$122 Million Award Faces Sioux With Complex Decisions, N.Y. Times,
July 14, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. See also Deloria, supra note 97.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. United States, No. Civ. 80-5-062 (W.D.S.D. filed Sept. 11,
1980).
205. Long Beach Press-Telegram, Jan. 19, 1982, p. A7, col. 1. The Oglala also sought
to block payment of attorney's fees. The Court of Claims dismissed their objections on
May 20, 1981, awarding attorneys' fees to Sioux counsel at the statutory maximum rate
of ten percent. S. Taylor Jr., "3 Lawyers get $10 Million In Winning Case for Indians,"
N.Y. Times, May 27, 1981, part A, at 12. See also supra note 20.
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